One of the many unfortunate outcomes of the subprime mortgage crisis has been that unscrupulous predatory investors scooped up broad portfolios of real estate at very low prices, and then re-sold them in troubled neighborhoods to unqualified buyers on land installment contract.

This had the dual effects of victimizing unknowledgeable and unqualified buyers and keeping many times unoccupied and dilapidated properties from re-entering the stream of commerce with qualified buyers.

One of those predatory investors has been Harbour Portfolio Advisors.  Their tactics have spawned a New York Times article on their predatory practices, a law suit from the City of Cincinnati that resulted in an injunction against their practices from Judge Robert Ruehlman (Hamilton County Case No. A1702044) and an ordinance with new land installment contract regulations from the City of Cincinnati.  It takes quite a track record to spur that kind of remedial activity.

The routine practiced by Harbour Portfolio appears to be:

  1. Selling the property to unknowledgeable and unqualified buyers on land installment contract,
  2. Receiving a down payment and some monthly payments from the buyers.
  3. Once one payment is missed, declaring the buyers in default and taking the property back.
  4. If the buyer is able to perform, refusing to cooperate in the conclusion of the sale, eventually forcing a default from the buyer, and moving back to Step #3.  (This is certainly what our client experienced)

Our firm recently represented a victim of Harbour Portfolio’s predatory practices, and obtained a judgment from Judge Jody Luebbers.  The result was that without further payment our client obtained clear title to the property, obtained a damages award from Harbour Portfolio, and also an award of his attorneys fees from Harbour Portfolio.

If you have been victimized by the unscrupulous tactics of Harbour Portfolio in Ohio or Kentucky or other predatory lenders or sellers, contact either Chris Finney (513-943-6655) or Julie Gugino (513-943-5669).

We are glad to “Make a Difference” in your property or lending dispute.

The City of Cincinnati has enacted a new series of restrictions on property owners selling under land installment contracts as Chapter 870 of the Cincinnati Municipal Code.

It appears to be a response to the questionable tactics of a single large investor who bought a significant number of properties in the subprime mortgage crisis, and then resold portions of the portfolio to unqualified buyers on land installment contract.  This investor/seller is Harbor Portfolio Advisors, against whom this firm has successfully litigated.  You may read more on that here.

The new ordinance provides:

  • Before selling a property on land installment contract, the vendor must first obtain a certificate of occupancy for the property (CMC 870-03).
  • The vendor must both deliver to the certificate of occupancy to the vendee and record the land contract within 20 days (CMC 870-04).
  • The vendor may not require the vendee to sign a quit claim deed to the vendor at the time of execution of the land installment contract (CMC 870-07(d)).
  • The name listed on the records of the Auditor is presumed to be the owner for purposes of enforcing the ordinance.
  • The remedies under the Ordinance include rescission of the land contract (meaning the vendee can get paid back to him sums paid thereunder), and actual damages, statutory damages of $5,000 per violation and the vendee’s attorneys fees incurred in pursuing his remedies under the ordinance.

For more information about enforcing your rights under the new land installment contract statute or suing Harbor Portfolio Advisors in Ohio or Kentucky, contact Chris Finney (513-943-6655) or Julie Gugino (513-943-5669).

Finney Law Firm has the honor to represent citizen journalist Patricia Meade before the Ohio Supreme Court in her efforts to expose the workings of her hometown’s government to public scrutiny.

In State ex rel. Meade v. Village of Bratenahl, we are appealing lower courts decisions that permit public bodies in Ohio to vote on any issue by secret ballot. The opportunity for mischief is readily apparent.

The Ohio Supreme Court accepts only approximately 5% of appeals, so just getting the case accepted is a major accomplishment. We are cautiously optimistic that the Ohio Supreme Court will be convinced by our argument and longstanding precedent and overturn the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals.

Today we filed our merits brief. Read the brief online here or below. We expect that one or more “friends of the court” (interest groups or others who are not a party to the case, but are concerned with the outcome) will also file a brief in support of our position (an amicus brief) in the coming days. The village will have thirty days to file their own brief, and then we will have fifteen days to file a reply.

This case is an important case for all Ohioans, as it will determine what, if any, information the people are entitled to know about how their elected officials vote on particular issues and whether citizens will have an ability to hold their elected officials accountable for their official action.

View all case filings on the Ohio Supreme Court website, here.

We expect the Ohio Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the case sometime in early 2019.

Update – The Ohio Coalition for Open Government, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and the Ohio Association of Broadcasters filed an amicus brief today in support of our position. Read their brief here.

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Ohio Revised Code Section 3503.06(C)(1)(a) declares that “Except for a nominating petition for presidential electors, no person shall be entitled to circulate any petition unless the person is a resident of this state and is at least eighteen years of age.”

Pretty straightforward, right? Not exactly.

Why? Because in 2015, U.S. District Court Judge Michael Watson correctly determined that the law was unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the law:

Accordingly, the Court PERMANENTLY ENJOINS Defendants from enforcing the residency requirement for circulators of petitions for candidates and initiatives set forth in Ohio Revised Code § 3503.06(C)(1)(a).

Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, S.D.Ohio No. 2:13-cv-935, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184669, at *10 (Mar. 16, 2015)

This is also included in Chapter 11 of the Ohio Secretary of State’s Ohio Election Official Manual, “A circulator is not required to be an Ohio elector or an Ohio resident.”

So, while the law remains “on the books” it is not, in fact, the law.

Citizens in Charge involved a statewide initiative petition, but the injunction applies to the all enforcement of the residency requirement for any initiative or referendum petitions, and any candidate petitions.

Finney Law Firm has on numerous occasions co-counseled with the attorney for Citzens in Charge, Maurice Thompson of the 1851 Center for Constitutional Law and are disappointed that this case is not more well known among Ohio political activists.

The issue has come up recently relating to the Hamilton County Sales Tax petition effort, and ongoing efforts to return Cincinnati City Council to two year terms. And it appears that confusion abounds, even among experienced political hands.

If you are circulating a petition or considering using out of state circulators for a petition effort, and someone tells you that circulators must live in Ohio; politely let them know that they are wrong and ask them to stop spreading such misinformation. If the person spreading the misinformation is a government official, contact the petition committee so that they can engage their legal counsel.

Finney Law Firm has assisted in drafting petitions and litigating initiative and referendum efforts throughout Ohio. If you or your petition group need assistance, contact Christopher P. Finney at 513-943-6655 or use our online contact form.

Attorneys in the Cincinnati Solicitor’s office filed a motion to withdraw its prior filing opposing intervention by Derek Bauman and a motion for additional time to file a new response, in our suit alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act.

Bauman’s attorney Paul DeMarco raised the question of conflict in a letter July 17, 2018 letter, questioning whether the City’s response was on behalf of Dennary, Landsman Sittenfeld, Seelbach,  and Young; or if the Solicitor’s office would be filling a separate memo on their behalf. And if so, whether the Solicitor’s Office had obtained conflict waivers from their various clients.

Read the filings here and here.

Hon. Judge Ruehlman

Today Finney Law Firm, on behalf of our client Mark Miller, filed a memorandum in opposition to the recent motion filed by one-time City Council candidate Derek Bauman, to intervene in our Open Meetings Act suit against five members of the Cincinnati City Council.

Attorneys for the City of Cincinnati also filed a memorandum opposing the intervention.

Judge Robert Ruehlman has scheduled oral argument on the motion for July 30 at 11:30 a.m. in Room 300 of the Hamilton County Courthouse, 1000 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio. The public is welcome to attend the oral argument.

We oppose intervention because the filing appears to be a poorly disguised effort at political gamesmanship rather than a sincere piece of litigation. Read the Motion to Intervene here. Read our memorandum here or below. Read the City’s memorandum here.

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Finney Law Firm represents Mark Miller in two lawsuits against Cincinnati City Councilmembers Dennard, Landsman, Seelbach, Sittenfeld, and Young. The first involving violations of Ohio’s Open Meetings Act; the second involving violations of Ohio’s Public Records Act. Read about recent filings in the Open Meetings Act case here.

In the Public Records Act case – before the Hamilton County Court of Appeal – the Councilmembers filed a motion for in camera review and for a protective order to prevent dissemination of the Councilmembers’ text messages and emails

They Councilmembers admit that there are additional emails and text messages that should have been provided in response to our public records request but contend that they somehow are not “public records” as that term is defined in Ohio law.

We find the Councilmember’s motion disingenuous, particularly in light of their own recent leaking of some text messages to a friendly attorney who then filed a motion to intervene in the Open Meetings suit on behalf of their political ally, Derek Bauman.

The Councilmembers’ motion can be read here.

Our memorandum in opposition can be read here and below.

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Finney Law Firm represents Mark Miller in two lawsuits against Cincinnati City Councilmembers Dennard, Landsman, Seelbach, Sittenfeld, and Young. The first involving violations of Ohio’s Open Meetings Act; the second involving violations of Ohio’s Public Records Act. Read about recent filings in the Public Records Act case here.

In the Open Meetings case – before Judge Ruehlman of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas – the Councilmembers recently filed a motion to limit and prevent discovery and publication of any documents produced in discovery. Today we filed our memorandum in opposition to that motion.

The Councilmembers ask the Court to prevent discovery because they claim some of the emails and text messages may contain information embarrassing to themselves or third parties. We point out to the Court that those third parties can easily be invited to state for themselves whether they want the materials released to the public; and that the law requires more than simply reciting the words “risk of embarrassment” before the Court can limit discovery.

Ohio’s Courts, like every other public body, are to be open to the public. By attempting to prevent public access to information produced in discovery, the Councilmembers ask the Court to facilitate their violations of the Open Meetings Act.

The Court has scheduled oral argument for this motion on August 16 at 11 a.m. in Room 300 of the Hamilton County Courthouse.

The Councilmember’s motion can be read here.

Our memorandum in opposition can be read here and below.

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Whether they planned it this way since (or even before) they granted certiorari to both Janus v. AFSCME and National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, or whether things just fell into place, two of the three the crowning decisions from the last week of the current term of the U.S. Supreme Court will deal with the important and still-evolving “compelled speech” doctrine under the First Amendment.  And we predict these two cases will be decided in such a way as to advance this doctrine as a bulwark against state and local governments compelling certain speech from private citizens and enterprises.

The compelled speech doctrine

The compelled speech doctrine is that legislators, regulators and other government actors cannot require an individual or group to engage in certain expression. We typically think of the First Amendment as limiting the government from punishing someone because of  his speech.  The compelled speech doctrine also prevents those same government officials from punishing someone for refusing to advance the government’s approved messages.

In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) SCOTUS advanced the compelled speech doctrine by ruling that a state cannot force a child to stand, salute the flag, and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.  The Court allowed school children who are Jehovah’s Witnesses (for religious reasons) to refuse to participate in the district-required speech. From the decision:

If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.

Just last decade, in  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (2006), Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. stated the principle more directly:

Some of this Court’s leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.

And this doctrine has been advanced in other cases, such as Wooley v. Maynard (1977) (state officials could not punish a man for covering the state’s motto — “Live Free or Die” — on his license plate) and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) (government actors violated the rights of parade organizers by requiring that they include a gay rights group and its messages).

Notably as to the Janus decision (discussed below), the court addressed this issue in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977).  However, because that decision did not go as far as the Janus petitioners seek, the Janus case (we predict) will overturn the Aboud precedent.  In Aboud, the Court allowed states to mandate public union membership, but split the dues between collective bargaining activities (compulsion OK) and political activities (compulsion forbidden).

Roberts Court loves the First Amendment

Then, as we have expressed previously, if the Roberts Court stands for anything, it is advancing First Amendment protections, including into areas not previously sacrosanct.  We expect the Janus and NIF&LA cases will continue that trend, but in these cases in the specific area of compelled speech.

Janus

The Janus decision is the third try recently to overturn the “halfway” decision in Abood. Again, in Abood, the Court ruled that the Plaintiff could be forced by the Detroit School District to pay a “fair share” or “agency” fee to the labor union for collective bargaining services, reasoning that not to do so would allow them to be a “free rider” for those services.   The Janus decision directly challenges that hair-splitting, arguing that compelling union membership is indeed compelling support of all of those things the union supports, including their position in contract negotiations, with which a member may disagree.

In 2014, the high court decided Harris v. Quinn, a curve-ball case of the State of Illinois compelling payment of union “agency fees” for collective bargaining by home health care workers who were not direct employees of the state, or in the words of the court “full-fledged public employees.”  The court ruled “no.”  In doing so, however, it did not directly overturn Abood, but Justice Scalia invited Abood challenges by stating in his opinion that it had been incorrectly-decided.

That invited the case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association in the 2015-16 term, which certainly would have extinguished the Abood precedent, except that Justice Scalia — who started the firestorm — died after oral argument but before the case could be decided.  The Friedrichs case, which appears to be indistinguishable from Janus, was thus decided 4-4 with the Scalia-short court, upholding the 9th District opinion that was consistent with Abood.

Thus, this coming week we expect that the compelled speech doctrine will get a substantial shot in the arm, albeit by a 5-4 vote, by the Supreme Court in its Janus decision broadly preventing government actors from negotiating union contracts that compel union membership or union dues as a condition employment.

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra

And that brings us to NIF&LA v. Becerra which seeks to invalidate a California law requiring pro-life counseling centers that counsel against abortion (“crisis pregnancy centers”) to to provide patients with specific kinds of information, including, for some, the availability of low-cost or free abortions.

We believe the Court will again advance the compelled speech doctrine by striking the California law.

(This will then raise the further question about pro-life state legislatures who require abortion clinics to provide certain information to patients arguably advancing an anti-abortion message.)

So, a big week is expected for the First Amendment and the Compelled Speech doctrine

Thus, it appears to me that the Supreme Court has written the theme for the last week of the Court term by joining the timing of announcing these decisions (if not the decisions themselves)  for the same day or week.

Crescendoing the 2017-2018 term with these two decisions, the Roberts Court will firmly boost the compelled speech doctrine.

This morning the Ohio Supreme Court accepted our appeal from a Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals case questioning whether Ohio’s Open Meetings Act permits public bodies to vote by secret ballot.

A 2011 Ohio Attorney General’s Opinion Letter says no, as does a 2011 Hamilton County Common Pleas Court decision. But to date, the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed this question. But the Cuyahoga County Courts disagreed.

This is an important case, meriting an amicus brief in support of jurisdiction from the Ohio Coalition for Open Government. Learn more about OCOG here.

The Ohio Supreme Court now has an opportunity to declare once and for all that secret ballot voting is not consistent with the demands of open government.

Case documents in State of Ohio ex rel. More Bratenahl et al. v. Village of Bratenahl et al.  are available on the Ohio Supreme Court’s website, here.

We will post updates as briefing is completed. Read more about this case here.