• posted: Dec. 03, 2015
  • Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC
  • Uncategorized

Written By: Scott R. Thomas

You started your business on a shoe-string but you’ve worked hard and built it up.  Now you’re at the point where you’re ready to take on other people to help shoulder the work.  You’ve interviewed several candidates you think have the potential to become true partners as you take your company to the next level.  But then you think, “What if it doesn’t work out?”  Your mind starts racing.  “What if I invest in this new employee, provide expensive training, share my business model, provide access to my hard-won customers, and then he/she leaves to go to my competitor?  Or decides he/she can hang up his own shingle?”  So you decide to make the prospective employee sign a covenant against competition.  If you go that route, there are a number of pitfalls that you need to avoid.  American judges don’t like non-competes because they are a restraint on free trade.  Courts will enforce them but they have to be fair and reasonable or your non-compete agreement won’t be worth the proverbial paper it’s written on.  Here are the “Top Ten” things to keep in mind.

  • New employee. If you think you need the protection of a non-compete, make it part of the hiring process.  Once an employee has begun work, the employer must provide some additional value in exchange for the employee’s promise not to compete when the employment ends.  When the agreement is hammered out at the beginning, no consideration beyond the job itself is necessary to support the agreement.
  • Geography. You may want to make the new employee agree not to compete with you in the same galaxy but non-compete agreements must be reasonable.  Consider how far your most distant customer is.  Pushing the envelope beyond that distance is dangerous.  Try to match the non-compete zone to your company’s footprint.  Pick a radius to be drawn from each place where you do business.  The reasonableness of the length of the radius will vary with each business.  If it’s more appropriate, you may specify a city, or a county or other defined region but be prepared to show that you have customers to protect in the territory you’ve identified.
  • Duration. As with geography, you need to pick a time period that is reasonable.  You may wish to prevent the employee from competing till the rocks melt with the sun but judges will take a red pen to your agreement.  Again, the time period varies with the nature of the employer’s investment.  In some businesses, a year is appropriate; in others, two years might be reasonable.  Pushing it past two years is difficult.
  • Activities. The activities that are prohibited must be spelled out clearly and in detail.  If any ambiguity exists, the law requires the Court to interpret the agreement in favor of the employee.  Accordingly, you must state exactly what your new employee cannot do in the event the employment ends.  In this regard, it’s a good idea to define what your competitors look like—without naming them.  You don’t want your employee to have any wiggle room.
  • Injunctive relief. An injunction is an order from the Court that, in this case, would require your employee to refrain from violating the contract.  If the employee continues to violate the agreement, the Court can punish the employee via its contempt powers.  Your agreement should require the employee to agree to the things you would otherwise have to prove to the Court.  For example, the agreement should specify that the employee understands and agrees that if he were allowed to compete with the employer during the time and in the locale specified, you would suffer “irreparable harm,” i.e., harm that could not be remedied by mere dollars and cents.  By having the employee agree to the elements you would have to prove, you avoid much of the risk of litigation and make it much less expensive.
  • Damages too. Your agreement should also specify that you are entitled to damages.  I know what you’re thinking, that I just said the employer has to prove “irreparable harm” to get an injunction.  True enough, but your employee will have violated the agreement for some period of time before you get a chance to persuade a judge to give you the injunction.  In many cases, you won’t know that your employee has been unfairly competed for some weeks or months.  Your agreement should state that while you are entitled to injunctive relief going forward, you are also entitled to compensatory damages for the unfair competition that occurred before you obtained the injunction.
  • No Bond, thank you. Before an injunction takes effect, the Court has to specify a bond.  The bond is a surety that can be used to compensate the employee if it later turns out that the Court should not have issued the injunction. You don’t want to have to pay a bond to get the benefit of the bargain you made with the employee.  So put that in the agreement: the employee agrees that no bond is necessary to make the injunction effective.
  • No cherry-picking, if you please. While we’re making the employee promise not to compete, you ought to make him promise not to hire away your employees.  You don’t want to come in to work and find out that your ex-employee has made your secretary a better offer to come work for him five miles away.
  • Re-start the clock. Five hundred years ago, Hamlet complained about “the law’s delay.”  Courts try to work quickly when it comes to temporary restraining orders but things still take time, more time than you probably like.  By the time you get your injunction, your former employee may have been improperly competing for six months.  It’s only fair that that six months not be counted against the non-compete period in your agreement.  Unfortunately, that’s exactly what will happen unless you put language in the agreement that will re-start the non-compete period.
  • Attorney fees. In the absence of an agreement or statute, American litigants have to pay their own attorney fees.  You can change that by putting it in your agreement.  You can provide that the “prevailing party” gets an award of attorney fees from the other side.  You can even specify that the employee has to pay your attorney fees but not vice versa.  That sounds harsh but the employee is the one violating the agreement.  But you won’t get fees unless it’s in the agreement.

Lastly, the employer has to keep his nose clean too.  An injunction is what Courts call “equitable relief.”  The goal is fairness.  If the employer has violated the employment agreement is some way—e.g., not paying a promised bonus—the Court may deny a request for an injunction.  The Court is going to look at the conduct of both parties.

If you would like more information about these issues, please contact Scott Thomas.   Scott has secured victories for firm clients both seeking and defending claims for injunctive relief in Ohio and Kentucky courts.  He welcomes the opportunity to work with you on your case.  His direct line is 859.578.3862.  You can email him at sthomas@HemmerLaw.com.  If there is a particular topic you would like to see addressed in a blog, please send Scott an email with your ideas.

About Finney Law Firm, LLC

Founded in 2014, FLF has grown to 15 attorneys located in offices in Eastgate and downtown Cincinnati with five major practice areas: Corporate Law, Real Estate Law, Employment Law, Commercial Litigation and Public Interest and Constitutional Litigation.  FLF has the unique claim to three 9-0 victories at the United States Supreme Court for its public interest practice along with breakthrough class action work.

FLF also has an affiliated title insurance company, Ivy Pointe Title, LLC, that closes and insures nearly a thousand commercial and residential real estate transactions annually.

For more information about Finney Law Firm, visit finneylawfirm.com.

Media Contact: Mickey McClanahan; mickey@finneylawfirm.isoc.net; 513.797.2850.

 

  • posted: Dec. 01, 2015
  • Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC
  • Uncategorized

Written By: Justin Whittaker

What happens when your previously reliable commercial tenant stiffs you on the rent?  If you are a commercial landlord in Kentucky, you’ve likely had to grapple with this question.  If you are a commercial landlord who has not yet faced this issue, give it time; you’re up next.  All landlords have a fundamental interest in securing a responsible tenant to occupy their property, the security of their property, and collecting rent for the use of their property.  In the event of a breach of a commercial lease, the last thing the commercial landlord wants to do is misstep in securing its rights.  Any misstep may result in landlord being left out in the cold on months of rent, and damage to its property.  These risks will rear their ugly heads if the commercial eviction is not handled properly.

In Kentucky, the commercial eviction procedure is known as a “forcible detainer” proceeding.  The purpose of a forcible detainer proceeding is to simply determine who has the right to possession of the commercial property at issue.  Forcible detainer proceedings arise if the commercial tenant hasn’t paid rent, or if it has otherwise failed to comply with other terms of the commercial lease.  In order to recover the money owed by the tenant for back rent, late fees, damages, etc., a landlord is required to file a separate civil action against the tenant.  In either case, the commercial landlord must act swiftly – and act correctly – to secure its rights.

Commercial landlords are required to provide proper written notice and an opportunity for the tenant to cure its breach of the commercial lease.  If the commercial tenant fails to cure its breach within seven days of proper notice, the landlord must proceed formally by filing a forcible detainer complaint to evict the tenant.  After the complaint is filed, the court will schedule a hearing.  In Kentucky, a representative of the landlord must appear at the hearing to offer testimony as to the landlord’s right to possession of the property.  If the judge grants a forcible detainer judgment, the tenant has seven days to either vacate the property or appeal.  At this point, the commercial tenant can either make plans to vacate the property, appeal, or try to make a deal with you.

Resolution at this point may sound great.  It is important, however, that in your eagerness to put the matter behind you, you do not give up your rights to continue collecting rent and enforcing the commercial lease.  If the tenant appeals the forcible detainer judgment ordering it to vacate, the court will require it to post a bond in the form of ongoing rent payments.  The court clerk will hold these funds until the appeal is resolved.

If the tenant does not file an appeal but also does not willingly vacate the property by the end of the seventh day, the landlord must obtain a writ of possession from the district court judge and ask the County Sheriff to enforce the judgment.  The Sheriff will require a fee for this service, and precise instructions as to the removal of the tenant, either by “put out” or “set out.”  The Sheriff is then authorized to physically remove the tenant and reclaim the property for the landlord.  You may be tempted to avoid the hassle and expense of enlisting the Sheriff’s services and resort to “self help” in evicting the deadbeat tenant.  It is important to understand the risks to the self-help approach.  Regardless, once you have successfully removed the commercial tenant, you will need to secure as much of the back rent as possible through the enforcement of a “landlord’s lien” on the personal property of the tenant.  It is critical that you differentiate between the value of your lien and the overall value of the tenant’s property.  While you are entitled to receive value for rent of your property, you are not entitled to convert the tenant’s property in excess of the value of your lien, lest you face a lawsuit for damages and attorneys’ fees from the tenant.

If you need assistance with these issues, please do not hesitate to contact Justin Whittaker at 859.344.1188.  Justin is also happy to help you prepare a commercial lease agreement.  You can email Justin at jwhittaker@HemmerLaw.com.

About Finney Law Firm, LLC

Founded in 2014, FLF has grown to 15 attorneys located in offices in Eastgate and downtown Cincinnati with five major practice areas: Corporate Law, Real Estate Law, Employment Law, Commercial Litigation and Public Interest and Constitutional Litigation.  FLF has the unique claim to three 9-0 victories at the United States Supreme Court for its public interest practice along with breakthrough class action work.

FLF also has an affiliated title insurance company, Ivy Pointe Title, LLC, that closes and insures nearly a thousand commercial and residential real estate transactions annually.

For more information about Finney Law Firm, visit finneylawfirm.com.

Media Contact: Mickey McClanahan; mickey@finneylawfirm.isoc.net; 513.797.2850.

 

As previously reported in this blog, this firm has been honored to be selected as counsel to a group of Registered Land property owners to save that land registration system in Hamilton County, Ohio.

In the fall of 2014, the Hamilton County Commission voted 2-1 to abolish the Torrens land registration system.  Hamilton County has enjoyed the highest rate of land registration in the State.  Our clients then filed suit to block the abolition, in part based upon significant procedural errors on the part of the Hamilton County Commission in that abolition action.

During the pendency of that lawsuit, we successfully sought and obtained an injunction against the abolition of the system, requiring the Hamilton County Recorder to continue both “regular” land recording and the Torrens indexing.

In late October Judge Charles Kubicki dismissed the lawsuit, and then our plaintiff clients sought a “stay” of that decision — and a continuation of the Torrens land registration system pending appeal — first from Judge Kubicki and then from the 1st District Court of Appeals.  Both of those motions were denied.

Thus, at present, the Hamilton County Recorder has ceased some aspects of Torrens Land Registration.  We will report more fully in an update which procedures remain.

However, our appeal remains pending, and we have filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to expedite the disposition of the appeal, as the difficulty in restoring the Registered Land System may be compounded as time passes and hundreds if not thousands of documents require corrective indexing.

We’ll keep our blog readers advised as the appeal progresses.

 

  • posted: Nov. 23, 2015
  • Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC
  • Uncategorized

Written By: Matthew T. Cheeks

Has your practice done a HIPAA Risk Analysis lately?  Indiana provider pays $750,000 settlement for HIPAA violations.

Hacking and data breach incidences are increasingly common and have become a fact of life in modern business.  Regardless of the sector or industry, individuals rarely have to wait long before the next hack or breach grabs national headlines (e.g., government, banking, retail or healthcare).  The constant media attention and an increased awareness of the risks of identity theft have driven healthcare consumers’ concerns about the use and security of their electronic protected health information (ePHI).  This growing concern and the ease of electronically filing a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) complaint via the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights’ (OCR) online Complaint Portal have led to tremendous increases in the number of HIPAA complaints OCR receives.  For instance, there was a 16 percent increase in the number of complaints received between 2011 (9,018) and 2012 (10,457).  The number of complaints increased 24 percent in 2013 (12,974) and jumped 37 percent in 2014 when OCR received 17,779 complaints.  As healthcare consumers’ interest in ePHI has grown, so too has OCR’s enforcement efforts, and OCR publicly maintains that enforcement is a high priority.

The natural result of these factors is the increased risk to healthcare providers of potentially significant liability, particularly growing out of the failure to be proactive in guarding ePHI.  For example, OCR recently announced the $750,000 settlement of potential violations of HIPAA’s Security Rule and Privacy Rule against Cancer Care Group, P.C. (CCG), an Indiana-based group that includes 18 physicians.

CCG self-reported the theft of “computer server backup media” (e.g., back-up tapes) containing the unencrypted ePHI of 55,000 patients from a CCG employee’s vehicle in August 2012.  OCR’s investigation revealed that “CCG failed to conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ePHI help by CCG.”  OCR further found that CCG had “failed to implement policies and procedures that govern the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic media that contain [ePHI] into and out of a facility, and the movement of these items within the facility.”

While the impermissible disclosure of ePHI of 55,000 patients certainly played a role in the outcome of OCR’s investigation, it is clear that CCG’s failure proactively address the security of ePHI was a—if not the—significant factor.  OCR reinforced its emphasis on the Risk Analysis and Risk Management requirements (45 C.F.R. §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) and (B)) in the Resolution Agreement and required CCG adopt a “robust corrective action plan” subject to OCR’s review and approval.

Despite OCR’s efforts in recent years, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Office of Evaluation and Inspections, released two reports in September 2015 (found here and here) calling on OCR to strengthen its enforcement efforts regarding general privacy standards and security breach reporting requirements.  OCR agreed with the OIG’s reports, and indicated that it intends to do just that (the implementation of Phase 2 audits in 2016 will be part of these efforts).

Thus, all signs point to increasing risks for providers with respect to ePHI and the need to be proactive about the security of ePHI.  The unfortunate fact, however, is that policies and procedures—or lack thereof—similar to CCG’s are probably not uncommon.  Providers are too often reactionary, addressing these issues only after a breach for a variety of reasons (e.g., costs of risk analyses, costs of implementing recommended safeguards, or even a general unawareness of the need for the analyses).  Old adages often hit the mark and, when dealing with ePHI, an ounce of prevention is truly worth a pound of cure.

Matthew Cheeks is a trial attorney with Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC.  His practice focuses on helping individuals and businesses solve complex problems through negotiation, mediation, arbitration and trial.  You can reach him at mcheeks@hemmerlaw.com.

About Finney Law Firm, LLC

Founded in 2014, FLF has grown to 15 attorneys located in offices in Eastgate and downtown Cincinnati with five major practice areas: Corporate Law, Real Estate Law, Employment Law, Commercial Litigation and Public Interest and Constitutional Litigation.  FLF has the unique claim to three 9-0 victories at the United States Supreme Court for its public interest practice along with breakthrough class action work.

FLF also has an affiliated title insurance company, Ivy Pointe Title, LLC, that closes and insures nearly a thousand commercial and residential real estate transactions annually.

For more information about Finney Law Firm, visit finneylawfirm.com.

Media Contact: Mickey McClanahan; mickey@finneylawfirm.isoc.net; 513.797.2850.

 

  • posted: Nov. 12, 2015
  • Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC
  • Uncategorized

Written By: Kyle M. Winslow

Limited liability companies (“LLCs”) have become a popular business entity for individuals in Kentucky. One of the main reasons that Kentucky small business owners choose the LLC is because of the protection offered by Kentucky Revised Statute 275.150 – “no member…of a limited liability company…shall be personally liable by reason of being a member…for a debt, obligation, or liability” of the LLC. Generally, LLC members can take business risks and creditors cannot seek their personal assets should their business ventures fail.

However, the LLC protection is not absolute. “Veil piercing” is an equitable remedy that allows a court to impose personal liability on shareholders for a corporation’s wrongful acts. In Turner v. Andrew, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that the doctrine can also apply to LLCs.

In 2012, the Supreme Court of Kentucky clarified the test for veil piercing in Inter Tel Techs v. Linn Station, LLC. While Inter Tel Techs discusses veil piercing in the context of a corporation, Kentucky law does not distinguish between corporations and LLCs when analyzing the equitable remedy. In Inter Tel Techs, The Supreme Court stated that in its determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil, trial courts should essentially resolve two dispositive elements: (1) domination of the corporation resulting in a loss of corporate separateness and (2) circumstances under which continued recognition of the corporation would sanction fraud or promote injustice.

So how does the veil piercing doctrine affect small businesses? In Inter Tel Techs, the Court noted that in assessing the first element above, courts give the most emphasis to several factors, one of which is the egregious failure to observe legal formalities.

In my practice, piercing the corporate veil has come up most often where small businesses fail to follow the legal formalities associated with the business entity. This can include failure to hold meetings, failure to keep records of important decisions, and failure to monitor the activities of its members. To avoid personal liability, LLC members should make sure that they know the ins and outs of their LLC’s operating agreement and strictly comply with the agreement’s provisions.

Our team at Hemmer DeFrank Wessels is ready to answer any questions that you may have about your operating agreement or corporate bylaws, or how the legal doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may affect your business.

Kyle Winslow is an attorney with Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC. He helps business professionals solve problems in Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana.

About Finney Law Firm, LLC

Founded in 2014, FLF has grown to 15 attorneys located in offices in Eastgate and downtown Cincinnati with five major practice areas: Corporate Law, Real Estate Law, Employment Law, Commercial Litigation and Public Interest and Constitutional Litigation.  FLF has the unique claim to three 9-0 victories at the United States Supreme Court for its public interest practice along with breakthrough class action work.

FLF also has an affiliated title insurance company, Ivy Pointe Title, LLC, that closes and insures nearly a thousand commercial and residential real estate transactions annually.

For more information about Finney Law Firm, visit finneylawfirm.com.

Media Contact: Mickey McClanahan; mickey@finneylawfirm.isoc.net; 513.797.2850.

 

Listed below are legislative bills currently pending in the 131st Ohio General Assembly. If you would like to view full text of each individual legislation, please click on the links below.

S.B.85Property-Tax Complaints

Sponsored by Senator Bill Coley (R)

Introduced to the Senate on February 23, 2015, Senate Bill 85 addresses property tax complaints and is currently pending in the Ways and Means Committee. The Bill would amend sections 307.699, 3735.67, 5715.19, 5715.27, and 5717.01 of the Revised Code to only permit property tax complaints to be initiated by the property owner, the property owner’s spouse or representative, or the county recorder. Right now, the current law allows property owners, the property owner’s spouse or representative, the county recorder, a real estate broker, the board of county commissioners, the prosecuting attorney or treasurer of the county, the board of township trustees, the board of education, or the mayor to file a property tax complaint.

S.B.180Anti Discrimination-Employment

Sponsored by Senator Joe Uecker (R)

On June 10, 2015, Senate Bill 180 was introduced to the Senate and is now currently pending in the Senate Civil Justice Committee. Senate Bill 180 would make it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to fire an employee without just cause, refuse to hire a potential employee, or to discriminate against someone regarding matters related to employment just because that person exercised a constitutional right within a house or car not owned by their employer. The Bill would also allow a person to file a charge with the Civil Right Commission if they find that another person has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice. The Civil Rights Commission would then investigate the unlawful discriminatory practice.

S.B.201Nuisance-Vacant Property

Sponsored by Senator Jim Hughes (R)

Under current law, a “nuisance” property is defined as a real property where prostitution, the illegal manufacturing or selling of alcohol, and/or the production of indecent films takes place. Senate Bill 201, introduced to the Senate on August 10, 2015, would expand the definition of “nuisance property” to include any real property where an offence of violence has occurred or is occurring. Real Property also includes vacant land. For purposes of this Bill, an offence of violence has many definitions, some of which are: robbery, kidnapping, murder, assault, child abuse, riots, burglary, domestic violence, arson, and human trafficking. S.B. 201 would also continue to allow the Attorney General to call an abatement proceeding on the nuisance property, which could eventually result in the property being deemed unavailable for use for one year. As of October 14, 2015, S.B. 201 is pending in the Civil Justice Committee.

H.B.134Foreclosure-Vacant Properties

Sponsored by Representative Cheryl Grossman (R) and Representative Michael Curtin (D)

House Bill 134, which addresses a number of issues regarding judicial foreclosure actions, is currently pending in the House Judiciary Committee. First, if a residential property appears to be vacant or abandoned, the Bill would allow the mortgage holder to bring a summary foreclosure action against the property. It would also modify the judicial sale procedure by requiring the sheriff to record the deed of a foreclosed property within a certain time period. If the deed is not recorded within a certain time period, the property will be transferred to the purchaser by the recording of the order of confirmation of sale. In regards to unoccupied property, the Bill would allow a municipal corporation to seek an order of remediation against the owner of the property. Lastly, if H.B.134 passes, it would place additional duties on the clerk of common pleas court pertaining to the notification and service of parties involved in a foreclosure action.

H.B.149Attorney’s Fees- Actual Damages

Sponsored by Representative Jonathan Dever (R) and Representative John Patterson (D)

Introduced to the House on April 13, 2015 and currently pending in the House Financial Institutions and HUD Committee, House Bill 149 relates to damages and attorney’s fees in housing discrimination cases. The Ohio Fair Housing Law currently prohibits discrimination when it comes to purchasing, selling, or renting a house. Under this Bill, if the Civil Right Commission finds that someone is engaging in unlawful housing discrimination, the Commission is permitted to require that person to pay actual damages and attorney’s fees. The current law requires the assessment of actual damages and attorney’s fees and permits the assessment of punitive damages in regards to housing discrimination claims.

H.B.226Condominium Liens

Sponsored by Representative John Rogers (D)

On May 21, 2015, House Bill 226 was introduced to the House and is now pending in the House Commerce and Labor Committee. H.B. 226 would provide that a lien filed by a condominium association against the owner’s interest in the unit has priority over other liens and encumbrances that were previously recorded, with the exception of political subdivision assessments and real estate tax liens. It would also provide that the condominium lien is a continuing lien and is subject to automatic adjustments for additional fees, costs, assessments and unpaid interest.

H.B.281Income Tax Deduction-Higher Education

Sponsored by Representative John M. Rogers (D)

Introduced to the House on July 7, 2015 and currently pending in the House Ways and Means Committee, House Bill 281 would allow recent college graduates to take a personal income tax deduction for specific out-of-pocket higher education expenses. Out-of-pocket higher education expenses would consist of: school supplies, books, tuition, fees, any type of equipment that the student would use in or for class, and room and board expenses.

H.B.330Equal Pay Certificate

Sponsored by Stephanie Howse (D) and Representative Kathleen Clyde (D)

House Bill 330 would amend multiple sections of the Revised Code regarding contractors and individuals submitting bids or proposals for state contracts and business entities applying for a grant. As introduce to the House on September 14, 2015, H.B. 330 would require contractors, individuals, and business entities to do the following: prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee who discusses their wage rate or salary with another employee, eliminate sex-based wage discrepancies and obtain an equal pay certificate. This Bill is currently pending in the House State Government Committee.

 

School administrators have the unenviable responsibilities of both educating our youth and keeping them safe.  As school violence continues to make national headlines administrators are increasingly wary of “off-campus student speech” – think social media postings – made by their students.  How do we balance a school’s need to maintain discipline in the school-setting, with the student’s first amendment rights to free speech?  Do we as a society allow schools to take a more authoritarian approach to disciplining our youth given the spate of violence, or do student’s free speech rights trump the school’s ability to discipline students for conduct that occurs away from the school yard?

The United States Supreme Court established the standard for “on-campus” speech regulation in 1969 in Tinker v. Des Moines.  In that decision, the Supreme Court decided that students who wore black armbands to school in protest of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War did not materially or substantially interfere with the operation of the schools or collide with the rights of others.  The Court issued the now oft-quoted refrain that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”  Yet, at the same time, the Court established that school administrators may restrict student speech that poses a risk of substantial disruption with the work or discipline of the school.

Following Tinker, the Supreme Court continued to refine First Amendment jurisprudence in the public school context, finding that: (1) schools can restrict vulgar and lewd speech (Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser); (2) schools can restrict student speech that appears to be sponsored by the school (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier); (3) schools can restrict student speech promoting illegal drug use (Morse v. Frederick).

The Supreme Court could not have imagined the development of social media and its impact on the student speech when it decided in Tinker in 1969.  As social media continues to expand avenues of communication and expression for our youth, the federal district courts continue to tackle speech issues without further guidance from the Supreme Court.   I first became interested in this issue six years ago in law school while researching student speech issues for a law review article.  Ultimately I published an article that examined off-campus speech in the context of the second circuit’s decision in Doninger v. Niehoff.  In that article, I argued that the Supreme Court’s standard for on-campus speech regulation enunciated in Tinker is workable in the context of off-campus speech. S ix years later the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue in the Bell v. Itawamba County School Board.  In Bell, a high school student and aspiring rapper wrote and recorded a song at a studio unaffiliated with the school and posted the song on his Facebook page and on YouTube using his personal computer.  The song included criticism of and “threatening language against two high school teachers/coaches” who allegedly sexually harassed female students.  In response, the School board suspended Bell and transferred him to an alternative school.  Bell subsequently filed suit against the school arguing that this disciplinary action violated his First Amendment right to free speech.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, finding that the school officials acted reasonably.   On appeal, a panel for the appellate court reversed, finding in favor of Bell.  The school then petitioned for the case to be heard by the appellate court en banc, meaning that the entire bench (all of the judges of the court) would hear the case.  Its petition was granted and the appellate court reinstated summary judgment in favor of the school. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit held that the school did not violate Bell’s First Amendment rights.

The Court examined Bell’s case in the context of Tinker and its progeny.  After reviewing these cases, the Court rejected Bell’s arguments that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech and that, even if it does, Bell’s conduct did not satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.  Instead, the Court held that the school acted appropriately in disciplining Bell because “a school official reasonably could find Bell’s rap recording threatened, harassed, and intimated the two teachers…and a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast.”

The Court reasoned that “violence forecast by a student against a teacher does reach the level of the …exceptions necessitating divergence from Tinker’s general rule” and that, due to the advent of new technology such as the internet, smartphones, and digital social media, “off-campus threats, harassment, and intimidation directed at teachers create a tension between a student’s free-speech rights and a school official’s duty to maintain discipline and protect the school community.”  The appellate court found that the school’s interest in being able to act quickly and intervene before speech leads to violence outweighed Bell’s interest in free speech.  As a result, the Fifth Circuit determined that Tinker’s substantial disruption test applies when a student intentionally directs at the school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimate a teacher, even when the speech originated off campus.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision illuminates the struggle our federal courts have had in developing a consistent approach to these issues, evidenced by the four dissenting opinions it elicited.  One dissent criticized the majority’s recognition of the school’s right to discipline a student whistle-blower.  Another dissent explained that off-campus, online student speech is a poor fit for any of the First Amendment doctrines and expressed hope that the Supreme Court will soon give the lower courts guidance on how to resolve these cases. The third dissent essentially agreed with the panel majority’s opinion and felt that the en banc majority unnecessarily expanded Tinker to apply in this case.  Finally, the last dissent generally posited that Tinker did not apply to off-campus speech and that, instead, he would apply a modified Tinker standard to allow for the problems current technology poses.  Under even a modified standard, though, the dissenter opined that the school’s discipline of Bell would fail.

As we see in Bell, the courts continue to wrestle with whether and how to apply Tinker and its progeny to off-campus student speech. Ever-increasing technology poses additional questions that the courts will continue to struggle with until the Supreme Court weights in on the issue.

My guess is that Supreme Court will address the question sooner the later. Whether the Tinker substantial disruption test will be adopted for off-campus speech, or some hybrid test is created, remains to be seen. In my mind, although the Tinker Court never imagined the ease of communication in the smart phone era, its test remains a viable and important tool for school administrators to curtail speech when it poses a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the school environment.

 

 

The 6th Circuit en banc released an opinion today that allowed an an “extreme and ill-mannered evangelical group” to march on public streets through City streets in Dearbourn, Michigan “with banners, signs, and tee-shirts that displayed messages criticizing Islam and Mohammed.”  The demonstrations occurred during the annual Arab International Festival that attracts more than 300,000 persons over three days.

The group made themselves intentionally controversial, carrying around a severed pig’s head on a spike and and signs that said, “Islam is a Religion of Blood and Murder.” However, all their activities were on publicly-dedicated streets and sidewalks.

The County had argued that the speech of Bible Believers constituted “fighting words” and “incitement to violence” and thus could be banned.

The issue was whether Bible Believers had a right to engage in street preaching, and to parade around with their printed messages. The festival allowed groups to register for an assigned table, under the information tent, but not parade about the festival.  The Plaintiffs, Bible Believers, preferred to move around on the public streets and sidewalks where they could be seen.

The 6th Circuit decision says “fighting words” only means words directed at an individual who is present.  As to incitement, the decision says that Bible Believers did not ask anyone listening to do anything violent.

The case is Bible Believers v Wayne County, Michigan, 13-1635.

  • posted: Oct. 30, 2015
  • Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC
  • Uncategorized

Written By: Kyle M. Winslow

The construction industry is on the rebound in Kentucky and throughout the rest of the country. In northern Kentucky, our river cities are booming with various development projects. Nevertheless, in a good or bad economy, contractors and subcontractors encounter payment problems.

Kentucky’s mechanic’s lien statutes, found in Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 376, provide protection to construction companies who furnish materials and labor on public or private projects.

While some of the statutes’ terms are interpreted liberally, Kentucky courts have consistently held that lien claimants must strictly comply with the notice requirements of KRS 376. Due to the demands of the construction industry, contractors and subcontractors routinely miss these deadlines and forfeit the leverage and security that accompany a mechanic’s lien.  The general notice requirements for private projects can be simplified into four steps:

(1) Preliminary Statement of Lien. The lien claimant should file a Preliminary Statement of Lien with the county clerk to secure priority over subsequently recorded liens. While the Preliminary Statement of Lien is not required to establish a valid mechanic’s lien, it protects the lien’s precedence. Since it’s not required, there is no deadline to file the Preliminary Statement of Lien.

(2) Notice of Intent to File Lien. Prior to filing the Lien Statement, subcontractors must notify in writing the owner of the property to be held liable or his authorized agent, of their intent to file a lien. This notification must be completed within 120 days on claims in excess of $1,000 (75 days on claims amounting to less than $1,000) after the last item of material or labor is furnished.

(3) Lien Statement. Lien claimants must file their Lien Statement with the county clerk within 6 months of the last day on which the lien claimant last furnished labor or materials. KRS 376.080(1) imposes strict requirements on the form of the Lien Statement.

(4) Notice to Property Owner. The lien claimant must send by regular mail a copy of the Lien Statement to the property owner at his last known address within seven days of filing the Lien Statement. Failure to follow this last requirement dissolves the lien.

In my practice, when a client anticipates payment problems, I immediately calendar all four steps on my personal calendar and on my firm’s litigation practice group calendar. I have forms for all four steps so when a deadline arrives, I’m prepared to take action. Should your company encounter payment problems, I’d encourage you to contact a construction lawyer familiar with the ins and outs of KRS 376. While many of the deadlines seem simple, they often involve complex factual issues.

About Finney Law Firm, LLC

Founded in 2014, FLF has grown to 15 attorneys located in offices in Eastgate and downtown Cincinnati with five major practice areas: Corporate Law, Real Estate Law, Employment Law, Commercial Litigation and Public Interest and Constitutional Litigation.  FLF has the unique claim to three 9-0 victories at the United States Supreme Court for its public interest practice along with breakthrough class action work.

FLF also has an affiliated title insurance company, Ivy Pointe Title, LLC, that closes and insures nearly a thousand commercial and residential real estate transactions annually.

For more information about Finney Law Firm, visit finneylawfirm.com.

Media Contact: Mickey McClanahan; mickey@finneylawfirm.isoc.net; 513.797.2850.

 

Written By: Todd V. McMurtry

Over the years I have practiced law, one of the most common complaints that I have encountered is when business partners encounter difficulty in their relationships.  For example, one member may believe another has acted selfishly, diverted a valuable business opportunity or not disclosed significant expenditures.  This article will focus on the duties and obligations that business partners in member-managed Kentucky Limited Liability Companies (“LLC”) have to each other and from where those obligations arise.  It will help members of a member-managed LLC better understand the obligations each has to the other. 

An LLC is a legal entity that among many other benefits protects its members from personal liability for the acts of the LLC.  LLCs can be managed by a manager or by its members.  When managed by its members, each member of the LLC has authority to bind the LLC.  With the exception that it insulates its members from liability, it is similar to a partnership. 

In Kentucky, a member in a member-managed LLC owes the duties required by the operating agreement and the LLC Act. Additionally, a member may still owe duties imposed by the common-law.  An LLC operating agreement is an agreement among the LLC members about how an LLC will function.  Generally, the members can govern themselves in any manner they wish.  This includes limits on the duties that each may have to the other.  But, when an operating agreement does not limit those duties, Kentucky law governs. 

Kentucky Revised Statute 275.170(1) imposes on members a statutory duty of care. A member is liable to another member if his act or failure to act constitutes wanton or reckless misconduct.  To limit liability to wanton or reckless misconduct is consistent with Kentucky’s business judgment rule that protects business decision makers from liability where they act in good faith, on an informed basis, and in a manner honestly believed to be in the best interest of the LLC.  It is logical then that members in a member-managed LLC should always act in an honest and informed manner.  To act otherwise may subject them to liability. 

Members of a member-managed LLC also owe duties to the LLC.  KRS 275.170(2) imposes on members a statutory duty of loyalty. This duty does not apply to the other members.  Reported Kentucky cases suggest this duty applies to conduct such as diverting business from the LLC to oneself or another company that person owns or controls.

In addition to the statutory duties of care and loyalty, the common-law may also impose fiduciary duties on LLC members. The Kentucky courts have held that absent contrary provisions in an operating agreement, members owe each other a common-law fiduciary duty. 

In conclusion, a member of a member-managed LLC owes the other members a duty of care.  A member must act in good faith, on an informed basis and in the best interest of the LLC.  As well, a member should be very familiar with the operating agreement that governs the LLC.  While this seems like common sense, problems with these duties and obligations arise with great frequency. 

About Finney Law Firm, LLC

Founded in 2014, FLF has grown to 15 attorneys located in offices in Eastgate and downtown Cincinnati with five major practice areas: Corporate Law, Real Estate Law, Employment Law, Commercial Litigation and Public Interest and Constitutional Litigation.  FLF has the unique claim to three 9-0 victories at the United States Supreme Court for its public interest practice along with breakthrough class action work.

FLF also has an affiliated title insurance company, Ivy Pointe Title, LLC, that closes and insures nearly a thousand commercial and residential real estate transactions annually.

For more information about Finney Law Firm, visit finneylawfirm.com.

Media Contact: Mickey McClanahan; mickey@finneylawfirm.isoc.net; 513.797.2850.